Commentary: Cross-strait peace a hard nut to crack

Chinese President Hu Jintao extended an olive branch to Taiwan in his speech at the 17th Communist Party Congress last month, adopting a far more conciliatory tone toward the island than he has used in the past.

    "On the basis of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for peaceful development of cross-strait relations and thus usher in a new phase of peaceful development," Hu said.

    Compared to his previous hostile remarks, Hu's offer may be seen as progress toward a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue. It may also be seen as Hu's response to a suggestion put forth by Taiwan's opposition party, the Kuomintang, that the two sides sign a 50-year truce agreement. This idea was advocated by the party's chairman, Ma Ying-jeou, when he visited the United States last year.

    International response to Hu's proposal has been positive, especially from the United States, as well as from some voices in Taiwan. Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party has not responded positively to Hu's comments, however, nor has the KMT officially done so.

    Hu's policy toward Taiwan is in line with his philosophy of establishing a harmonious world. The current leadership realizes that neither an aggressive nor static attitude toward Taiwan will help solve the Taiwan issue. An approach based on a philosophy of harmony, stressing a win-win result, can allow differences to be resolved through dialogue, negotiation and other positive interaction.

    On the other hand, Hu's new policy toward Taiwan is practicable. Contrary to the CCP's previous Taiwan policy, the new suggestion to end the state of war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait offers more flexibility. Rather than only emphasizing the mainland's standpoint on unification, Hu's suggestion shows more concern for Taiwanese sensibilities and sense of identity.

    The Chinese Communist Party's senior leaders may have come to realize that engagement with Taiwan's leaders may be more effective in preventing moves toward independence in the island. Intimacy rather than intimidation may bring Taiwan closer to mainland China. This approach is more likely to bring peace in the near future. A 50-year truce agreement could possibly be signed, as well as a framework for peaceful development.

    However, that would not mean all the tough issues concerning unification had been resolved, or that a full peace treaty would be at hand. Considering the long history of separation and the years of hostility between Taiwan and mainland China, as well as Taiwan's special political environment, a number of issues will not easily be resolved. There are five such "hard nuts to crack."

    The first is the sovereignty issue. This is a key issue that cannot be overridden or easily passed over. Who will sign the peace treaty? Would it be Taiwan, a province of the People's Republic of China? Would it be the Republic of China?

    If the Kuomintang wins Taiwan's election in 2008, it will be in a good position to negotiate with the CCP. However, if the party abandons its commitment to eventual unification and to the 1992 Consensus -- an agreement between the CCP and KMT that there is only one China, but each side could interpret what that meant -- then the KMT to some extent would lose its legitimacy as a negotiating partner in the eyes of the CCP.

    On the other hand, if the DPP wins the election and continues its pro-independence policy, the situation could become uncontrollable and unpredictable. Intensified conflict or even war could replace dialogue, eventually turning the Taiwan Strait into a disastrous battleground.

    The second issue at hand is the question of legitimacy. Could China agree to a treaty that did not include the "one China principle"? If that is impossible, then to which China will "one China" refer? The People's Republic of China is the only legitimate entity represented in the United Nations, a body composed of sovereign states. yet the fact is the Republic of China still exists, at least in Taiwan.

    So how to interpret "one China" is still an issue to be decided. For both the CCP and Taiwan's leaders, the essence of "one China" must be clarified if they really want to conclude a treaty.

    The third issue is the system gap. For mainland China, if a peace treaty were signed it can be assumed that the National People's Congress would approve it. However for Taiwan, because of its democratic framework, even if the executive -- Ma Ying-jeou, for example -- were willing to sign such a pact, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan could refuse to ratify it. If that happened, the validity of the treaty would be in question.

    The fourth issue is that even if a 50-year truce were agreed upon, what would happen 50 years later? Peace might be guaranteed in the short term, but anxiety would cloud the long-term relationship. If either party sought to revoke or amend the treaty, who would guarantee its validity? The prospect of unification might be the only leverage one side or the other would have, but this would raise other issues as already mentioned.

    Last but not least, what roles would other countries possibly play? Although the CCP insists that the Taiwan issue is an internal affair of the PRC, it is an undeniable fact that certain countries, especially the United States and Japan, have influence over this issue. Even if the two sides desired a peace treaty, would these powerful players be positive and cooperative?

    Coming to the reality, even the relatively simple issue of allowing the Olympic torch to pass through Taiwan was not successfully resolved. If the two sides failed to reach agreement over such a matter, how could they possibly reach agreement over the bigger, tougher issue of the cross-strait relationship? Therefore, the Taiwan nut will not so easily be cracked. It will definitely require more wisdom and flexibility from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

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    (Zhang Quanyi is an associate professor at the Zhejiang Wanli University in Ningbo, China, and a PhD candidate at Shanghai International Studies University, studying policy making and collective identity. He is currently a research fellow at the School of International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, under a grant by the Korea Foundation. He can be contacted at qyzhangupi@yahoo.com. �Copyright Zhang Quanyi.)